Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign: Why the Relentless 2026 Drive Still Continues

Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign began after he became general secretary of the Communist Party of China in November 2012. Nearly 14 years later, it is not fading into the background. Instead, the drive has widened from local officials and provincial leaders to senior military commanders, state-owned enterprises, financial institutions and alleged corruption that crosses China’s borders.

China’s official 2025 discipline report said discipline inspection and supervision agencies filed more than 1 million cases in 2025 and imposed disciplinary or administrative penalties on 983,000 people. In 2026, the campaign has continued to reach officials once considered exceptionally powerful, including senior military leaders. That persistence helps explain why Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign remains one of the defining policies of his leadership.

The latest developments also show that this is no longer best understood as a temporary clean-up launched at the start of Xi’s rule. Beijing presents the campaign as a permanent effort to protect the Communist Party’s integrity, strengthen discipline and prevent corruption from damaging public trust. Outside analysts, however, also examine its role in centralising authority, enforcing political loyalty and reshaping China’s governing elite.

Understanding why Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign still continues therefore requires looking at both sides of the story: the genuine scale of corruption that Chinese authorities say they are confronting, and the political effects of a system in which the anti-graft apparatus answers to the party leadership.

What Changed After China’s 2026 Political Meetings

The March 2026 session of the National People’s Congress offered a visible reminder of how deeply the purge had reached. Around 100 delegates were absent from the opening session after a series of removals and disciplinary cases. Among the most prominent absences were senior figures caught up in the continuing shake-up of the party and military establishment.

The News Ink has separately examined how China removed military and provincial officials as political pressure intensified. Those removals are important because they show that Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is not confined to lower-level bureaucracy. It has repeatedly reached institutions central to national security and elite political power.

Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign has moved further since the March meetings. In July, former Politburo member Ma Xingrui was expelled from the Communist Party and dismissed from public office after investigators accused him of serious disciplinary and legal violations. His suspected criminal case was transferred to prosecutors.

Then, on August 25, Reuters reported that China’s military had opened a public drive seeking information about procurement violations in the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, including possible irregularities in engineering, supplies, bidding and contract execution.

A day later, Chinese lawmakers were reviewing a draft law intended to strengthen the pursuit of corruption suspects and assets overseas.

These developments make the article’s original question even more relevant. Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign continues because the leadership is increasingly treating anti-graft enforcement as an enduring part of how the party governs rather than a campaign with a defined end date.

From 2012 to a Permanent Feature of Xi’s Rule

Xi took over as Communist Party general secretary in November 2012 at a time when corruption was widely regarded inside China as a threat to the party’s legitimacy. Previous Chinese leaders had also warned about the problem, but Xi gave anti-corruption enforcement far greater political prominence and scale.

Soon after taking power, he promised to pursue both “tigers” and “flies”: senior officials as well as lower-ranking cadres. The slogan captured the message that status would not provide immunity. Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign rapidly produced cases involving officials whose rank once made prosecution appear politically difficult.

One distinction is important. The downfall of Bo Xilai, the former Chongqing party chief, began before Xi formally became party general secretary. Bo was removed from senior positions in 2012 and later sentenced to life imprisonment. His case became part of the turbulent political backdrop against which Xi took power, but it should not be described as a case initiated by Xi after the campaign began.

Later cases more directly demonstrated the new leadership’s reach. Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee and former security chief, was convicted of bribery, abuse of power and intentionally disclosing state secrets and received a life sentence in 2015.

Ling Jihua, a former senior aide to Hu Jintao, was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2016 after being convicted of bribery, illegally obtaining state secrets and abuse of power.

Those cases established a pattern for Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign: it could reach figures near the top of the party-state hierarchy, not only local administrators.

The Numbers Show Why the Campaign Is Still Politically Central

The Communist Party is enormous. Official membership figures released in June 2026 put its membership at 101.286 million as of the end of 2025, with more than 5.43 million primary-level party organisations.

Governing and monitoring a political organisation of that size creates obvious discipline and oversight challenges.

The most recent annual anti-graft data underline the scale of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign.

2025 Anti-Corruption Indicator	Official Figure
Cases filed by discipline and supervision bodies	More than 1 million
People given disciplinary or administrative penalties	983,000
Officials managed at central level investigated	181
People who voluntarily surrendered	26,000
Corruption fugitives repatriated to China	963
Cases involving misconduct and corruption affecting ordinary people	967,000
People punished in those grassroots-related cases	627,000

These figures come from China’s own disciplinary and state-media reporting, so they reflect the official enforcement system and its definitions.

“Disciplinary action” is not the same as a criminal conviction. Outcomes can include warnings, party penalties, administrative punishment, expulsion, transfer to prosecutors and, in serious cases, imprisonment after court proceedings.

That distinction matters when evaluating Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. A headline saying that hundreds of thousands were “punished for corruption” can blur very different types of conduct and sanction.

The more accurate picture is a vast disciplinary system dealing with corruption allegations, party-rule violations, abuse of authority, improper benefits, bureaucratic misconduct and other breaches.

Why the Military Has Become the Most Dramatic Front

The People’s Liberation Army is now one of the most consequential areas of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign.

The January 2026 investigations of Central Military Commission vice-chairman Zhang Youxia and Joint Staff Department chief Liu Zhenli marked an extraordinary escalation.

China’s Ministry of National Defense announcement said both men were being investigated for suspected serious violations of discipline and law.

Because allegations in such cases can precede any criminal court process, they should be described as investigations unless and until prosecutors and courts announce further outcomes.

The importance of Zhang’s case goes beyond rank. He had long been viewed as one of China’s most senior military figures and had personal and political ties close to the top leadership. His investigation reinforced the leadership’s public message that high office does not place an official beyond scrutiny.

Independent analysis suggests the military shake-up is exceptionally broad. A 2026 study by the CSIS China Power Project identified more than 100 senior PLA officers who had been removed or had gone missing from public view since 2022.

The researchers argue that the scale raises questions about leadership continuity, command experience and short-term military readiness.

At the same time, Chinese official accounts frame the purges differently. They describe corruption as a threat to military effectiveness, modernisation and political reliability.

From that perspective, Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign inside the PLA is intended to create a more disciplined force that follows the Communist Party’s command.

Both interpretations can matter at once. Removing corrupt networks may improve long-term institutional control, while removing large numbers of senior commanders can also create short-term disruption.

Why Corruption Remains Difficult to Eliminate

If millions of officials have faced investigation or discipline since 2012, why has Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign not ended the problem?

One answer is scale. China has a vast administrative system stretching from the central government to provinces, municipalities, counties, townships, state enterprises, universities, hospitals and village-level bodies.

The opportunities for conflicts of interest, procurement abuse, patronage and misuse of public authority are correspondingly large.

A second answer is incentives. The party itself repeatedly warns about officials using power for private benefit, accepting gifts, manipulating projects, interfering in appointments or allowing family members and associates to profit from political influence.

A third answer is that corruption changes form.

Enforcement can make older methods more dangerous while encouraging more concealed arrangements. China’s anti-graft authorities increasingly speak about detecting new or disguised forms of corruption, including benefits transferred through relatives, business arrangements or future rewards.

Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign has therefore evolved from spectacular early “tiger” cases into a much broader system of inspections, audits, disciplinary education, lifestyle rules, procurement scrutiny and supervision of officials’ conduct.

The “Tigers and Flies” Strategy Has Never Really Stopped

The phrase “tigers and flies” remains useful because the campaign operates at both ends of the political hierarchy.

At the top, Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign has reached officials such as Zhou Yongkang, former military leaders, ministers, provincial party chiefs and senior state-enterprise executives. These are the cases that attract international attention because they reveal shifts inside China’s elite.

At the lower end are the enormous numbers of local cases that affect ordinary people more directly.

Chinese disciplinary authorities have recently focused on what they describe as corruption and misconduct “around the people”, including problems involving school meals, rural assets, health services, local enforcement and public funds.

In 2025, authorities reported 967,000 cases involving misconduct and corruption affecting people at the grassroots level, with 627,000 individuals punished and 22,000 transferred to procuratorial organs.

This grassroots focus is politically important.

Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is presented not simply as an elite purge but as a way to show citizens that abusive local officials can be punished. For a ruling party that places great emphasis on political stability and public confidence, visible enforcement can help demonstrate responsiveness to everyday grievances.

Anti-Corruption and the Concentration of Political Power

There is also a harder political question: does the campaign fight corruption, consolidate Xi’s power, or do both?

Chinese official explanations emphasise discipline, clean government, party self-governance and the need to place power inside what Xi has called an institutional “cage.”

In January 2026, Xi told the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection that anti-corruption work should continue with greater resolve during the 2026-2030 Five-Year Plan period.

Outside researchers often agree that corruption is a real governance problem while arguing that enforcement also has political consequences.

Investigations can dismantle patronage networks, remove officials whose loyalty is questioned and strengthen the centre’s control over personnel.

That does not mean every corruption case is fabricated or that every removal is primarily political. There is rarely enough public evidence to make such a sweeping claim, and China’s opaque elite politics makes individual motives difficult to establish independently.

A more defensible conclusion is that Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign serves several functions simultaneously.

It punishes documented misconduct, deters officials, changes bureaucratic behaviour, strengthens party discipline and concentrates political authority around the central leadership.

The Risk of Fear and Bureaucratic Paralysis

Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign can create deterrence, but tough discipline can also create caution.

Officials who fear that a decision could later be treated as improper may become reluctant to approve projects, experiment with policy or take responsibility for difficult choices.

This problem is sometimes described as bureaucratic paralysis or official inaction.

China’s own anti-graft reporting acknowledges a related problem from a different angle. Discipline bodies have repeatedly targeted formalism, bureaucratism and officials who fail to perform their duties.

In 2025, authorities reported large numbers of cases involving inaction, arbitrary behaviour and poor performance that affected development and public administration.

This creates a governing dilemma.

Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is supposed to make officials cleaner and more disciplined, but the leadership also needs them to make decisions, implement economic policy and respond quickly to local problems.

The tension is especially important as Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign continues into China’s 15th Five-Year Plan period.

The country is trying to manage slower economic growth, technological competition, demographic pressures, property-sector problems and national-security priorities at the same time.

A bureaucracy that is disciplined but afraid to act would create its own risks.

A Campaign That Is Becoming More Institutionalised

The biggest change since the early years is that anti-corruption enforcement is becoming more embedded in institutions and law.

China created the National Commission of Supervision in 2018, extending state supervision alongside the party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.

The system now combines internal party discipline with statutory supervision of public officials.

The August 2026 move toward a cross-border anti-corruption law is another sign of that evolution.

According to Reuters’ report on the draft legislation, lawmakers are examining provisions designed to improve the pursuit of corruption suspects, assets and international cooperation.

Chinese authorities say Operation Sky Net has brought thousands of fugitives back from overseas and recovered large amounts of assets.

International critics have raised concerns about some overseas operations and the methods used to secure returns, making transparency and international legal cooperation an important part of the debate.

The point is broader than one proposed law.

Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is moving from the language of a “campaign” toward a permanent architecture of supervision, party rules, criminal enforcement, international recovery efforts and political education.

What 2026 Tells Us About the Campaign’s Future

Several developments this year suggest that Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is unlikely to end soon.

The institutional direction of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign also points toward continued enforcement rather than a declared finish.

First, Xi has explicitly linked strict party governance and anti-corruption work to the entire 2026-2030 planning period.

Second, senior officials are still being investigated and removed.

Third, military procurement remains under active scrutiny.

Fourth, Beijing is developing new legal tools aimed at corruption that crosses national borders.

The July expulsion of Ma Xingrui is particularly significant because he was a former Politburo member and had held senior positions in Xinjiang, Guangdong and China’s aerospace sector.

His case shows that the campaign continues to reach people with extensive experience inside the upper levels of the system.

The August Rocket Force initiative reinforces the same point.

Procurement is a classic corruption risk because large budgets, specialised equipment, restricted information and complicated contracting can make oversight difficult.

China’s invitation for tips covering planning, bidding, contract performance and online purchasing suggests authorities are looking beyond individual officers toward systems where improper conduct may occur.

For readers following the wider political context, The News Ink’s coverage of Xi Jinping’s 2026 North Korea visit shows how the Chinese leader is simultaneously managing domestic party control and high-stakes foreign policy.

Why Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign Still Continues

The simplest explanation is that China’s leadership does not believe the corruption problem has been solved.

Official statistics show enormous numbers of cases every year. High-ranking officials continue to fall. The military remains under intense scrutiny. Local misconduct remains a major enforcement target. New mechanisms are being designed for overseas assets and fugitives.

But the continuing campaign also reflects Xi’s broader theory of governing the Communist Party.

He has repeatedly argued that a ruling party can survive long term only if it can police itself, remove internal threats and prevent officials from becoming detached from the public.

That makes Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign more than a law-enforcement programme.

It is tied to party legitimacy, elite discipline, bureaucratic control, military loyalty and Xi’s concept of “self-revolution.”

The unresolved question is whether a permanent high-pressure campaign can solve the structural conditions that produce corruption or whether it mainly becomes a permanent mechanism for managing them.

Supporters point to the sheer number of investigations and the removal of powerful officials as evidence that enforcement is serious.

Critics question transparency, institutional independence and the political power created by a centrally controlled disciplinary system.

Nearly 14 years after it began, Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign has survived far longer than many temporary political crackdowns.

The events of 2026 show why: Beijing has made anti-corruption part of the operating system of party rule itself.

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